The Internet's architecture was designed to be fundamentally neutral among different types of content, applications, and devices. Last-mile facilities-based broadband Internet access service providers (hereafter, "ISPs") provide end-users with access to the Internet, but they are expected to route all traffic in a nondiscriminatory manner. They do not charge Internet content or application providers to reach end-users, and they are expected to route traffic without regard to what that traffic contains, who it is from, or where it is going.
This paper discusses an important underlying economic justificationnamely, positive spillovers -for "network neutrality" regulation that aims to prevent ISPs from engaging in discriminatory practices. As in many regulatory contexts, an important reason for intervention in the market is that private decisions are incompletely reflected in private costs and benefits. Rather, there are spillover costs and benefits that do not accrue to those making the decisions, and thus the decisions may not be optimal from society's point of view. This paper argues that ISPs engaging in discriminatory practices would be a significant, discrete change in the economic configuration of the Internet. As such, the loss of positive spillovers would be much greater than, for example, a change in pricing of existing Internet services.
Suppose an ISP offered content providers the ability to have their traffic prioritized over other providers' traffic. Or suppose the ISP preferred one service or one set of applications over others or chose to block or slow a service or set of services. Clearly these would be large changes from current practice, but the question is why they should be a public policy concern. The reason is that the ISP would choose its preferred services or its prices for service classes based on the static, private valuations of those services.
That is, the ISP will base its preferred services and fees on what it can privately appropriate from the content provider's current (i.e. static) revenue from its content (which could be current advertising revenue or current subscription or product prices to consumers).
There are many standard economic results that suggest such preferences and pricing will be efficient, but they require that the static private values be consistent with dynamic, public values. That is, the preferences and prices set by the ISP would have to take into account the future (dynamic) potential of the content, and they would have to include any public values beyond the pure private revenue of the content provider.
Why would there be a divergence? First, the Internet is a general purpose technology (GPT) , which means that it is an input into a wide range of uses across the economy. This means that the applications of content providers often
have public values in excess of their private value.
Second, the Internet, as the name suggests, is a network of networks, which means that network effects are rampant throughout all Internet-associated products. These take time to grow and they accrue to users beyond the content provider, so the dynamic, public value is likely to be higher than the static, private value.
Third, the Internet is an innovation-spawning technology, so that almost all of its content is rapidly changing and developing, adding new value. This means that the static value of content may be much less than the dynamic value, since successful development will cause a future increase in value.
All of these effects are present to a small degree with an ordinary product, for example an industrial part. But they are greatly heightened in the context of the Internet by these three features. As I explain below, the full value to society of an open Internet and maintaining network neutrality is likely to be considerably higher than the value that an ISP would consider when setting prices and policies that would degrade the quality of some sources of content relative to others.
I also discuss the wide body of literature that examines these features in a number of areas. While a precise accounting of Internet spillovers would be difficult and is beyond the scope of this paper, the literature around various technologies can provide helpful indicators. This survey of the literature includes the following findings:
GPTs are a crucial factor in economic growth. The spillovers from GPTs, and from information technology (IT) in particular, are very large and affect entire economies. A recent study by economists at the Institute for Economic Research in Munich recognizes that broadband Internet access's benefits are rooted in its general purpose nature, and finds that a 10 percentage-point increase in broadband penetration raises a country's annual per-capita growth by 0.9-1.5 percentage points (Czernich et al. 2009 ).
Several research papers focusing on network effects within just a single network estimate that consumers value a 10% increase in the installed base of compatible users of a network the same as a 5% decrease in price.
Thus, if discrimination were to 'balkanize' the Internet and reduce the size of many network communities using various applications by similar amounts, the costs in terms of lost surplus from network externalities could be very large.
In several studies on R&D investment, estimated innovation spillover returns to society can be 2-3 times higher than private returns.
Economic Approaches to Efficiency
In this section we briefly discuss some standard terminology and approaches to whether market outcomes produce the highest possible social welfare. The discussion is illustrated using a supply-and-demand diagram in the Appendix.
Consumer surplus refers to the amount of welfare that goes to consumers of a product. It is the difference between the maximum price a consumer would be willing to pay and the actual price he pays in the marketplace. For free content, consumer surplus is the value, translated into monetary terms, that the consumer derives from viewing or reading the content.
Producer surplus is the difference between the price of a product and the variable cost of production. For a great many Internet-related products, the variable cost is close to zero, since duplication of digital content is essentially costless. Even more tangible items like bandwidth and computer parts typically have quite low variable costs. Thus, most of the revenue of Internet-related firms is producer surplus. This has to be weighed against the fixed costs of development of content or products, which may be quite high.
Efficiency -Marginal and Inframarginal
Standard economic theory predicts that all agents, both producers and consumers, will engage in production or consumption up to the point where the marginal benefit (the surplus from selling or consuming one more unit) is equal to the marginal cost (the incremental variable cost of producing or purchasing one more unit). This means that all possible consumer and producer surplus from a market is achieved.
In addition to this standard marginal result, there is also the surplus that accrues to inframarginal producers and consumers. For these agents, the market price is far above or below what they need to give them the incentive to produce or consume a marginal unit. Therefore, as long as there are no other impediments to the market, these agents will certainly be in the market and achieve their surpluses. Although the marginal agents determine the price in a competitive market, most of the surplus, and thus most of the social welfare, accrues to the inframarginal agents.
Spillovers -Externalities, Complementarities, and Appropriability
The case for government policy-making that affects markets often rests on spillovers, generally some type of direct effect of economic actions that is not mediated through the price system. Because spillovers are so central to justifying policy, this section discusses the nature of Internet spillovers from an economic theory perspective. The following sections then turn to three general categories of specific examples of spillovers.
An externality usually refers to an exception to the marginal efficiency result.
It is a case where, on the margin, too much or too little of an activity is done in a private market because the price of the good signals only the private marginal benefit or private marginal cost and not some additional social benefit or cost.
(This is the approach pioneered by Pigou (1924) that is taught in most economic textbooks.) The concept of externality is usually taken to imply that an agent does indeed have control over the activity, but that "the effect produced is not a deliberate creation but an unintended or incidental by-product of some otherwise legitimate activity." (Michan 1971, pg. 2) In the Internet context, externalities are often positive: for example, the contributors to Wikipedia create positive externalities to other Internet users by providing useful information, but they are not given monetary compensation for their efforts. In some cases it is possible to internalize an externality by finding a way to charge for a service that would otherwise be available for free. The most common method on the Web is to sell advertising; a second, less-common method is to charge a subscription fee and protect the website with a password.
Usually when an externality is internalized, it is then simply referred to as an effect (see Leibowitz and Margolis (1994) for discussion of this in the network context).
In most economic literature, an externality only creates an inefficient market outcome if it meets two conditions. First, it must be possible to find an alternative pricing or advertising scheme that fixes the externality without prohibitively high transactions costs. Second, the pricing must actually change behavior on the margin relating to the externality. (Papanderou 1994) For example, computer networks may increase employee productivity at a firm, but a system for ISPs to charge for these effects would have prohibitively high transactions costs. Also, given limits in individual employees' ability to discern how the network affects productivity, it is not clear that such a system could be behavior affecting.
Nonetheless, there is a strand of economic thinking on this type of spillover effect that is important for understanding policies like network neutrality. This thinking goes back to Dupuit (1844) who was looking at indivisible decisions such as whether or not to build a bridge. He noted that while bridge tolls might be efficient on the margin, the large inframarginal surplus created by a bridge might make it socially desirable even if the tolls did not cover the cost.
One important implication of these inframarginal externalities, or more simply, complementarities, is that certain configurations of economic activity may be more desirable for an industry or a nation than others. This logic has been used both with respect to individual industries and whole economies of developing countries -for early and more recent reviews see Scitovsky (1954) and Azariadis and Stachurski (2005) .
The other area where complementarities are important is innovation. Arrow complementarities is that externalities can create inefficient prices, whereas complementarities only matter when considering discrete policy changes or outright prohibitions of certain activities. If, for example, an ISP decided to disable e-mail service, then all the complementarities that come from people using e-mail would be lost, and this would be a cost of the change in policy.
With this background, we are now equipped with concepts to think about the effects of discriminatory practices by ISPs. In addition to the private effects on ISPs, there would be various types of marginal externalities and inframarginal complementarities. These need to be accounted for in policymaking. In the following sections, we identify three main reasons why these effects may be large for the Internet: the fact that the Internet is a general purpose technology, the presence of network effects, and the importance of innovation.
General Purpose Technology
The Internet is used in a huge number of different ways throughout the economy. This feature is shared with other key technologies like electricity, railroads, and the internal combustion engine. LCB define a GPT as "a single generic technology, recognizable as such over its whole lifetime, that initially has much scope for improvement and eventually comes to be widely used, to have many uses, and to have many spillover effects."
(98) We deal with the "scope for improvement" in section 5 on Innovation. In this section we concern ourselves with the "widely used" issue, and the resultant spillover effects.
The spillovers from GPTs, and from information technology (IT) in particular,
are very large and affect entire economies. Jorgenson and Stiroh (1999) The important point here is that the range of uses is so large, and the effects so diffuse, that it is very difficult to appropriate all of the benefits -see OECD 
Network Effects
For many technologies, and especially for the Internet, the value of the network as a whole rises as the number of users increases. Furthermore, this is also true of many applications on the Internet, which are themselves networks that connect users -whether for e-commerce, socializing, information retrieval, and so forth. Katz and Shapiro (1985) identified two ways this could happen, either a direct effect from user to user or an indirect effect operating through complementary goods.
Direct Network Effects
When the effect is direct, the consumers get value directly from communicating with each other. The most famous early example of this was the telephone network, and many of the basic Internet protocols also involve direct communication -e-mail and chat for example. There has been a resurgence of
Internet applications designed to create direct network effects, often under the label "Web 2.0." These allow users to directly share profiles and pictures (Facebook), current activities (Twitter), favorite news stories (Digg), speak to each other (Voice over IP, e.g., Skype,) and so on.
Regardless of the specific application, all direct networks share the feature that users desire to communicate with one another, and the more possible pairs or groups of users, the more value the entire system has. Thus, when a new user joins such a network, all of the other users receive a positive spillover.
Sometimes the network can encourage joining with introductory pricing or other incentives, in which case the spillover may be internalized into a network effect, while in other cases it may remain an externality.
The reverse of a network effect can be called a nonuser negative network effect, so that when a user either leaves or does not join a network, there is a loss of what would otherwise be the positive network effect. (Nagler 2009 ) Any impediment to a user joining the network therefore has nonuser negative effect on all users. For example, suppose an ISP introduces a traffic management practice that forces users to pay extra for a voice application like Skype. Then some users will not feel the benefits of joining are sufficient to justify paying the fee, and they will not join. But this does not create a loss for that consumer alone. All of the other users of the network will also receive less value, even if they choose to pay the fee, because the direct network effect has been reduced.
Indirect Network Effects
With an indirect network effect, users also value the system more as the total number of users rises, but through a different mechanism. There are also content providers who choose to offer various products on the system, and these are what users want to use. The more users, the more content providers will provide the products, and therefore the more value to the users.
Indirect network effects occur at several levels in the Internet. At the broadest level, the more Internet users there are, the more Internet-related applications will be developed, but this is more of an innovation effect, which we discuss below. But at a narrower level, many of the applications developed for the Internet are themselves platforms with their own user and content provider communities. For example, standards like html and xml have this property -the more users with web browsers or other applications that use the latest versions of these standards, the more incentive for programmers to develop new applications that use them. The same is true for some websites -for example, the more users of Facebook, the more incentive for developers to create new Facebook applications.
Again, each user creates a spillover effect beyond his or her own benefit from joining the system and using various products. If a user is prevented or dissuaded from being part of the system due to certain types of traffic being prohibited or delayed, then the effect spills over into less new product development, hurting both the business of the developers and the value of other users.
Cross-Platform Indirect Network Effects
A cross-platform indirect network effect is a type of indirect network effect that happens through the (partial) compatibility of different platforms. 
Network Neutrality and Network Effects
If ISPs were to prioritize or degrade service for certain applications, certain websites, etc., there could be a reduction in both types of network effects. 
Estimates of Network Effects
No one knows the total value of network effects emanating from the Internet.
Since the Internet is a network of networks, and since many of the applications that run on the Internet are themselves networks, the total number of networks is huge. There is a well-developed body of research that estimates the value of network effects on just one network. A summary of this work, which is surveyed in Birke (2009) , is presented in Table 1 in the appendix.
The first thing to note is that consumers value network effects a lot. Several of the papers study how much consumers value a 10% increase in the installed base of compatible users of a network. While the methods used vary, it seems that consumers typically equate this to about a 5% decrease in price of the network good. Thus, for example, if a change like network discrimination reduced the compatible installed base by, say 30%, the consumer would be harmed the same as if the networked good (say, a social network website) had raised its price by 15%.
Only one of the studies directly attempts to measure the uninternalized network externalities from compatibility. Ohashi (2003) examined the wellknown example of VHS and Betamax video cassettes in the 1980s. He estimates that if, hypothetically, these had been compatible in 1986, there would have been indirect network externalities equal to almost $10 per US household. Multiplied across many millions of consumers, this is particularly substantial.
While these measures do not directly value the network effects of the Internet, they do suggest that the values are very large, especially when multiplied over the many networked applications that run on the Internet. If discrimination were to 'balkanize' the Internet and thus reduce the size of network communities using various applications, the costs in terms of lost surplus from network externalities could be very large.
Innovation
The most dramatic source of spillovers from the Internet is innovation. Firms and other types of users throughout the economy make the Internet an input into new activities, and these in turn add value for society.
At the broadest level, the Internet is used to increase efficiency and productivity in a wide array of industries. This diffusion of the Internet throughout the economy takes time, as firms produce new products and find improved ways to make existing products, using the Internet as an input. A bank, for example, can offer financial services with web-based or cell-phonebased updates. A trucking firm can use online GPS tracking to improve scheduling and delivery times. A firm like eBay may take a very old activityrunning an auction house -and completely redefine it by using the Internet as an input. These are examples of extended technological complementarities of the Internet, where the Internet is the key driver, but the spillover takes place in another industry, like trucking or auctions. Diffusion like this is common with all GPTs -electricity for example took a long time to fully penetrate the economy, reorganizing everything from factory floor layouts to the hours of shopping and working. (David 1990) Internet applications themselves are a large source of innovation, and they usually piggyback on one another. In other words, the Internet is a platform for many innovations, some of which are platforms for innovations as well. For example, consider the http on the World Wide Web itself. http is an innovation built on top of the Internet that in turn ushered in countless additional technologies -starting with websites themselves, to search engines, social networking, and so on. Some of these tools might also be platforms for follow-on innovation; for instance, people use Google Maps to create "mash-ups" that combine, for instance, maps with housing data, and developers create applications that operate on top of Facebook. In this way, innovation online is often "recursive" (Zittrain) .
One form of "innovation" is less dramatic, but at least as important to In absorbing an Internet application, firms face a great deal of risk. There is risk relating to the costs of the project, the benefits of the project, and also the ongoing value of the application in relation to other Internet applications. This relation to other applications is important because most firms try to reuse their applications to perform multiple tasks; this is called technological convergence by Rosenberg (1976) . Arrow (1962) first noted the extensive appropriation problems in settings like this. The chain of innovation is so extensive that it is very unlikely that the owner of any one innovation fully appropriates all of the innovation's surplus.
Indeed, society would not want him or her to do so, since the follow-on uses are often not predictable. For example, when Tim Berners-Lee invented the Web, he could never have predicted the wide array of innovations to which it would give rise. Thus, whatever the apparent, immediate impact of discriminating among applications today, the full consequences of that cannot be predicted.
As in the previous two cases, the difference between externalities and complementarities is important. In many cases, innovation may not involve an externality on the margin. Probably more common, there are discrete innovation decisions that are indivisible. Either the innovator has access to crucial inputs or access to the market, or he or she does not. If not, then potential inframarginal surplus is lost since the innovation is not created.
Discrimination by ISPs would also make it less likely that developers would use new inputs, since there would be uncertainty as to whether the input would work for all users and whether it might be arbitrarily degraded in the future.
The size of spillovers from innovation have been studied by several authors and are surveyed in Lemley and Frischmann (2006) . Details are presented in Table 2 in the appendix. Generally the findings are that innovators do in fact earn high returns to the capital they invest, which is not surprising since innovation is a very risky activity. The estimated spillover returns to society as a whole are much higher, in many studies 2 or 3 times higher. The fact that these social returns are so much higher than most financial returns should not be surprising, since the financial returns to any investment only reflect the surplus the investor can appropriate to himself or herself, whereas the returns to society reflect all the spillovers discussed above.
Conclusion
The Internet's benefits to society and to economic growth are enormous, and this paper has emphasized that most of these benefits come in the form of spillovers -benefits that accrue to third parties in the rest of the economy rather than directly to the ISP or its customers. Rauch (1993) Industrial park land prices 417-947% greater price appreciation in successful industrial parks compared with surrounding land. Brynjolfsson, Kemerer (1996) Spreadsheet software 10% increase in installed base associated with a 7.5% increase in price.
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VHS vs. Betamax VCRs 10% increase in installed base associated with a 9.6% increase in market share of one type of VCR. 1986 value of network externalities: $29 per US household. 1986 value of having VHS and Betamax be hypothetically compatible: $9.73 per US household.
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